In Great Britain, Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) thinking mirrored that of the more strategically minded Royal Navy, as illustrated by the RNAS’ attack on the German Imperial Navy’s Zeppelin sheds in late 1914. Simply put, it was not enough to defend airspace against incoming attacks; you had to go out and achieve control of the air by offensively attacking the enemy’s air assets, broadly defined, at the source. The Royal Navy became greatly concerned by the potential for German airships to strike warships and naval installations, and there are suggestions that Germany saw strategic air power as a potential force multiplier and a way to help negate Britain’s overwhelming naval dominance. While debates about bombing during the First World War generally avoid such controversies, the impact of such operations between 1914 and 1918 was three-fold: first, their political impact, especially in Britain, as the public, press and political reactions to German raiding were a driving factor in the creation of the RAF and contributed to the ongoing debates over independent air power; second, by compelling belligerants’ air arms to consider and develop localised air defence systems; and third, the legacy of strategic bombing in shaping air power theory, doctrine and practice in the post-war period.

It has been suggested that French operations illustrated a degree of restraint, though this was more for pragmatic and geographical reasons than for any significant moral or ethical objections. However, these objectives were deemed legitimate as they linked to naval production, thus extending the concept that attacking at the source was more efficient than seeking direct battle. However, geography and technological limitations precluded a long-range campaign against the hinterland of Austria-Hungary. Importantly, rather than being a partner, Germany dominated Austria-Hungary. Both the battles of Verdun and the Somme saw the large-scale use of air power in support of the land battle, but more importantly, the massing of fighter units to achieve control of the air. That means you should sharpen the bit regularly, and the harder the rock, the more often you should check the bit. Check out Solo Parasailing or Triple Parasailing! Instead, they were tasked to operate in combat air patrols searching out German aeroplanes. The defining characteristic of aerial combat during this period was its complex, attritional and industrial character. By 1918 RNAS/RAF activities had, for example, limited the “fighting ability” of the Marine Korps Flandern in Belgium and led Germans to combat this risk with increased GBAD, fighter defence, and their own OCA campaign to battle for control of the air.19 The United States mirrored these British air operations with the creation of the US Navy’s Northern Bombing Group.

From the Battle of Piave in June 1918 through to the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in October and November 1918, the Italians, with British and French support, achieved control of the air through the combined means of offensive-counter air operations (OCA) on Austro-Hungarian airfields while also contesting for air superiority. During this campaign, the RFC took to the offensive, and while the British possessed technically superior fighters, it was the way such aeroplanes were used that helped the British dominate the airspace over and around the battlefield. In turn, German air policy and practice came to rely on quality over quantity in the battle for the control of the air, illustrated by the introduction of the Fokker DVII. In turn, the RFC’s focus, the provision of tactical support, was shaped within the overarching ethos of the British army; an ethos that stressed the importance of moral superiority and offensive action.14 Similarly, as the conflict progressed, German air power developed a flexible and defensive approach to control of the air, which mirrored the strategy of the German army in the West. On entering the conflict, the Royal Navy looked to neutralise German air assets capable of striking Britain by launching an OCA campaign against airship sheds at the end of 1914. Demonstrating the link between strategic air power and control of the air, these operations sought to limit the potential for strategic raids against Britain.

At the operational level, in 1918 the French introduced the Division Aerienne (Aerial Division) that was comprised of both bombers and fighters and allowed for the flexible use of air power, as it was not linked to a specific field army and could be redeployed to any point of the front to support operations. For example, by 1916, the RFC had introduced “Army” wings to control fighter units and “Corps” wings for close air support and reconnaissance that were brigaded together for better effect. Geography and technology also affected the RAF’s Independent Force and Germany’s so-called “England Geschwader”, which were stationed as close to their targets as possible. Air Force warplanes, including F-4 Phantom IIs, F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-111 Aardvarks, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, and the C-130 Hercules completed temporary duty rotations at Incirlik, not least in support of the base’s NATO/USAFE forward-deployed nuclear mission. This relationship was further compounded by the “general military disarray” that characterised the Austria-Hungary’s war effort.18 The Austria-Hungary example highlights the argument that a first-class aviation industry must support a first-class air force.